One of the things so remarkable about Rabbi Bechhofer is his
tenacity to stand by the truth - regardless of how others see him. He is a valiant
‘fighter’ for Emes as he understands it. A trait I very much admire.
An example of his determination to seek Emes is his
willingness to debate controversial figures in public. About 10 years
ago - in such pursuit - he debated Rabbi
Dov Linzer, Rosh HaYeshiva of Yeshivat Chovevei Torah at Lincoln Square Synagogue. This kind of engagement is healthy for Judaism. And a far cry from the way
some on the right want to boycott rabbinic figures with whom they disagree Hashkaficaly.
The following post was submitted to me by Rabbi Bechhofer.
It follows unedited in its entirety.
Seeing the schedule for the “alternative” Siyum HaShas,
I noted Rabbi Dov Linzer's topic for the shiur he will be giving at the event.
The topic is the very one that he originally proposed for a public debate that
we held at Lincoln Square Synagogue some ten years ago.
I believe a brief synopsis of that debate can shed light on
the controversy that surrounds YCT. I will try to refrain from superfluous
elaboration and embellishment. V'ha'mevin yavin.
We ultimately discarded that topic. The topic we debated
instead was the influence of his cultural background on the psak of a posek.
The issue that we chose to focus upon was whether it is permissible to enter a
mosque. This issue is the subject of a machlokes between the Tzitz
Eliezer, Rabbi Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg zt”l andlbc”c, the Yabia
Omer, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef shlita. The Tzitz Eliezer rules
that it is forbidden to enter a mosque, while Rav Ovadia rules that it is
permitted.
Rabbi Linzer explained the machlokes thus: The Tzitz
Eliezer was of Ashkenazic background, with greater affinity to the
prevalent Ashkenazic inter-religious issue with Christianity and the undisputed
prohibition on entering a church; whereas as Rav Ovadia is of Sepharadic
background, and therefore removed from the issue with Christianity, allowing
him to take a distinct and more sympathetic stance towards Islam. Accordingly,
the Tzitz Eliezer extended the prohibition on entering a church to a
mosque, while Rav Ovadia did not.
I countered that the machlokes actually reflects a
fundamental difference in Halachic decision-making approaches. There is a Ran –
a Rishon – who explicitly prohibits entry into a mosque (even though
he agrees that Islam is not Avodah Zarah). However, no such prohibition
appears either in the Rambam or in Shulchan Aruch. TheTzitz
Eliezer holds that when a Rishon's ruling is available to us, we
follow it [this is similar to the position of the Chazon Ish in the
great International Dateline debate]. Rav Ovadia, on the other hand, maintains that
the ruling of a Rishon not codified in the Rambam or in Shulchan
Aruch is not binding upon us [this is similar to the position of R' Tzvi
Pesach Frank in the great International Dateline debate].
(I also noted that the psycho-sociological analysis is
flawed, as, on the one hand, the Tzitz Eliezer was born and bred in
Yerushalayim, and, on the other hand, Jews from Arab countries often harbor
more animosity to Islam than do Jews of Ashkenazic background.)
In the course of the debate, as a further example of his
methodology, Rabbi Linzer discussed the permissibility of women reciting berachos on mitzvos
aseh she'ha'zman grama. This is the subject of a machlokes between Rabbeinu
Tam, who permits, and the Rambam, who forbids. This machlokes is
formalized in current practice, in which women affiliated with Ashkenazic
communities do recite berachos on mitzvos aseh she'ha'zman grama,
while women affiliated with Sepharadic communities do not.
Rabbi Linzer explained the machlokes thus: The Rambam lived
in the misogynistic environment of countries dominated by Islam. Accordingly,
his psak reflects the attitudes he absorbed from his environment. Rabbeinu
Tam, on the other hand, lived in the more enlightened (proto-feminist)
environment of Christendom. Accordingly, his psak reflects the
attitudes that he absorbed from his contrary environment.
I countered that the machlokes is very
straightforward: Whether the nusach of asher kideshanu
b'mitzvosav v'tzivanu applies to the individual – in which case it does
not apply to women, and who therefore may not be – or whether it applies to the
nation as a whole, in which case a woman may recite this nusach on
a mitzvas aseh she'ha'zman grama.
(I also noted that the psycho-sociological analysis is
flawed, as Rabbeinu Tam is responsible for the most regressive
“anti-feminist” law in our system [overturning, in the process, the law as
hitherto established by the Gaonim] – viz., that a woman cannot compel her
husband to give her a get on the basis of the simple her assertion
that she finds it impossible to live with him, for perhaps she is lying and
only initiated the divorce proceedings because eineha nasna b'acher.)
